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INTRODUCTION

Elizabeth Smart may be a household name, but the names of the
thousands of foster children currently missing from our child welfare system
are unknown to the American public and even to some of the agencies legally
responsible for their care. Each year, vast numbers of these young people, who
are predominantly children of color, become victims of sexual exploitation
while in the custody of the state or shortly after their planned release. At this
rate, and given population trends, the number of sexually exploited youth with
a history of foster care will climb to close to half a million in the next
generation. 1
The plight of these young people raises a unique legal question: Do
state and contract agencies bare any liability for this exploitation? Foster
children are in a unique position vis-a-vis the Constitution. They are wards of
the state but actually fare worse in federal courts than prisoners and
institutionalized adults, in terms of their right to be free from harm while in
custody. To be fair, it is not easy to monitor foster children; they are statutorily
entitled to the least restrictive foster care placement, as they should be. But
every effort should be made to ensure that they go unscathed. Too often, as a
result of institutional indifference, older foster youth are harmed due to a lack
of commitment to addressing their needs.
Even if it were well settled that the state owes a unique duty to foster
children, would this duty extend to youth who have absconded from custody
and been lured into “criminal” activity? What about youth who have been
discharged, but to precarious situations that put them at foreseeable risk?
Recent federal legislation regarding the sexual exploitation of foster youth
demonstrates political concern on the national stage, but the laws have no teeth.
Our states and localities do not actually invest in this population; nor do our
federal or state lawmakers hold anyone accountable for what happens to
adolescents while they are in the foster care system or following discharge. Are
we finally ready to hold child welfare agencies accountable for what happens to
foster children when they are missing or discharged from the system? Could
federal courts address this epidemic?
Constitutional law regarding prisoners, institutionalized adults, and the
residents of nursing homes suggests that it is time for the judiciary to step in.
The civil rights of other populations have not been addressed from the ground
up without court intervention. Unless we hold state agencies accountable, they
will never fully address the needs of adolescents in foster care; nor will they
truly revolutionize their service models to provide client-centered services that
actually work. Litigation is necessary in order to effectuate foster children’s
rights and realize actual reform in the child welfare system.

1

See infra notes 104, 137; see also infra Part II for an explanation of this projection.

CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/21/2015 2:41 PM

CIVIL RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE

1227

This paper examines the civil rights of youth who are missing or
discharged from foster care and become victims of sexual exploitation. It also
addresses future implications of this epidemic, given demographic patterns of
the United States, if we do not address this issue now. Section II describes the
demographics of adolescents in foster care. Next, Section III addresses the
sexual exploitation of this population. Section IV describes the legal framework
of the foster care system and legislation pertaining to sexually exploited youth.
Section V analyzes the constitutional rights of foster youth who become
victims of sexual exploitation and draws analogies to similarly situated groups
whose rights have been more firmly established by federal courts. Finally,
Section VI concludes that adolescents in foster care have a constitutional right
to be free from state action which puts them at risk for sexual exploitation.
II.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE

A. Adolescents Currently in Foster Care
Even though children in foster care are technically in the custody of the
state and each one should be accounted for, it is difficult to gauge precise
numbers of adolescents in foster care because of well-documented challenges
in the child welfare system. 2 These include, “poor monitoring[;] . . . inadequate
policies, training, and supervision; lack of effective decision making tools and
safety assessment protocols; and poor tracking systems, along with high
caseloads that limit the time available for visiting with families and
documenting cases,” according to the Child Welfare League of America. 3
Close to half of the children in foster care in the United States are
adolescents. In 2012, 46% were preteenagers and teenagers (11 and older); 4
youth ages 16 and older make up approximately 19% of all children in foster
care. 5 The vast majority of these youth will be discharged by the state to their
own legal custody, which is commonly referred to as being discharged to
“independent living.” 6 This means that at age 18, 19, or 21 (depending on state

2
CAREN KAPLAN, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILDREN MISSING FROM CARE: AN
ISSUE BRIEF ix (2014), available at http://66.227.70.18/programs/fostercare/childmiss01.pdf.
3

Id.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2012 ESTIMATES AS OF NOV. 2013 1 (2013) [hereinafter AFCARS NOV.
REPORT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport20.pdf.
4

5
Id.; see also LAUREN EYSTER & SARAH LOONEY OLDMIXON, NGA CENTER FOR BEST
PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE POLICIES TO HELP YOUTH TRANSITION OUT OF FOSTER CARE 2
(2007), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0701YOUTH.PDF.
6
Young People Leave Foster Care to a Family, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES
INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/young-people-leave-foster-care-family (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015) (“Historically, child welfare agencies, having been created to protect children and
support families, routinely authorized permanency plans of ‘independent living’ for older youth
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law) the youth are on their own, not the legal responsibility of any caring
adult. 7 This is also known as “aging out of foster care.”
Aging out is on the rise, despite efforts to eliminate “independent
living” as a foster care goal. 8 According to numerous studies, approximately
30,000 young people officially age out of foster care each year in the United
States. 9 Since 1999, more than 230,000 young people have been discharged
from foster care without a permanent family to go home to; 10 more than
165,000 from 1998 to 2005. 11 Most importantly, during this same seven-year
period (1998 to 2005, which is the last period for which aggregate data is
available), the percentage of all foster children who age out steadily increased
each year, and as of 2005, stood at 4.9%. 12 Some states have shocking
percentages of youth who age out—Virginia leads the pack, with 21% of the
state’s entire foster care population aging out, and Maine is close behind with

in foster care.”); see also John Kelly, APPLA: The Foster Care Exception That Ate the Rule, THE
CHRON. OF SOC. CHANGE (Aug. 15, 2013), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/analysis/appla-thefoster-care-exception-that-ate-the-rule/3756 (“Among youths that had reached 17 in foster
care . . . close to half had APPLA as an expected outcome.”); AFCARS NOV. REPORT, supra note
4 (stating that 21% of children in foster care had a goal other than adoption or reunification,
including goals of emancipation and long-term foster care); Jennifer Renee & Gerald P. Mallon,
Unpacking the No of Permanency for Youth: Overuse and Misuse of APPLA, THE HANDBOOK OF
CHILD WELFARE, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS (Columbia Univ. Press 2014), available at
http://www.nrcpfc.org/as-training/download/33.Renne.APPLA.Final.03.16.2012.pdf (stating that
in some states the goal of “long term foster care” is only available for a child over 12 years of
age, so all of the children with that goal are adolescents and will age out of foster care).
7
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110351, § 201(a), 122 Stat. 3949, 3957–58 (giving states the option of keeping 18-year-olds in foster
care); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 303 (2013) (extending the age of foster care to 21 in
California); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-600 (2014).
8
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (The
five permissible ASFA permanency plans are: return to parent; adoption; referral for legal
guardianship; permanent placement with a fit and willing relative; another planned permanent
living arrangement (but only if there is a compelling reason why none of the other ASFA
permanency plans is in the child’s best interests)). For a discussion of foster care goals, see infra
Part III.
9
Foster Care Resource Center, CHILDREN’S ACTION NETWORK, http://childrensaction
network.org/resources.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
10
Aging Out, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/
about/aging-out (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
11
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: AGING OUT AND ON THEIR OWN 1 (2007)
[hereinafter TIME FOR REFORM], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded
files/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/foster_care_reform/KidsareWaitingTimeforReform0307pdf.pdf;
Research, AGING OUT INSTITUTE, http://agingoutinstitute.com/research-3 (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) [hereinafter Research].
12

TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 11.
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19%. 13 Thirteen other states all age at least 10% of their foster children out of
foster care. 14
In fact, thousands of youth currently in foster care have been assigned
goals by their state agencies that are essentially the same as independent living,
but with new names, such as “emancipation” or “long-term foster care.” 15
These permanency goals indicate that child welfare officials no longer focus on
seeking families or other supportive adults to help transition these older youths
from foster care. In 2005, approximately 32,000 adolescents had a goal of
“emancipation,” and more than 37,000 had a goal of “long term foster care.” 16
These 69,000 youths, and those that have followed in the past nine years, were
on a path to leave foster care without a permanent family to count on.17
B. Adolescents Missing from Foster Care
Another estimated 30,000 youths age out of the foster care system but
are not officially counted by the state as discharged, because they run away or
are otherwise unable to be located by the state.18 Child welfare professionals—
caseworkers, social workers, therapists, lawyers, and judges—routinely refer to
runaways from foster care, as Absent Without Leave, or “AWOL.” This
language speaks to the impersonal and implicitly punitive nature of the system.
Children who run away from their family homes are never called AWOL by
anyone, even when they appear in court or at an institution such as a shelter.
This Article does not use this negative terminology; instead, in line with other
studies, the Article includes as “missing” foster children all those who have
either left care voluntarily (i.e., run away) or involuntarily (i.e., been abducted)
and/or cannot otherwise be accounted for by the agency responsible for their
placement (i.e., lost in care). 19
It is extremely difficult to ascertain precise numbers of missing foster
children because inherently, these children are lost and state and local
authorities have no incentive to report them as such or acknowledge that they
have lost track of their wards. In fact, there are no provisions in the federal
legislation governing foster care20 that specifically address the prevention,

13

Id.

14

Id.
Long-Term Foster Care Custody Act, ch. 139, 1992 N.J. Laws 1059; see 42 U.S.C § 677
(2013).
16
TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 11, at 3.
15

17

Id.
The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Aging Out of Foster Care (PBS television broadcast May
19, 2005).
19
KAPLAN, supra note 3, at viii.
18

20

See infra Part III.

CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1230

4/21/2015 2:41 PM

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

response to, or resolution of missing episodes. 21 Caseworkers are not required
to report missing foster children to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC), the agency whose federal mandate 22 is to work
in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice to help states find missing
children (including foster children), eliminate child sexual exploitation, and
prevent child victimization. Although state agencies make reports to the federal
government, 23 the federal government does not follow up on what happens to
these children or on whether these numbers are accurate. 24 Moreover, each state
has its own internal reporting and classification systems for youth who run; 25
some do not classify “runaways” at all. 26 One thing we know for sure: 61% of
homeless 18- and 19-year-olds have been in foster care at some point.27
No national numbers are available regarding the number of youth who
run away from foster care. 28 However, data from the Adoption and Foster Care
Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) 29 collected by the federal
government indicate that on September 30, 2009, 8,047 foster youth were on

21
SHANNON WILBER ET AL., CWLA BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 10 (2006) [hereinafter
CWLA], available at http://familyproject.sfsu.edu/sites/sites7.sfsu.edu.familyproject/files/best
practiceslgbtyouth.pdf.
22
42 U.S.C. § 5773 (2013); see Congressional Authorization, NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING
AND EXPLOITED CHILD., http://www.missingkids.com/Authorization (last visited Dec. 23, 2014)
[hereinafter Congressional Authorization]. A summary of NCMEC’s duties include: operating a
national 24-hour toll-free telephone line by which individuals may report information regarding
the location of any missing child and assisting the efforts of law enforcement agencies in
coordinating with child welfare agencies to respond to foster children missing from the state
welfare system. They also provide technical assistance to law enforcement agencies and first
responders in identifying, locating, and recovering victims of, and children at risk for, child sex
trafficking. Id.
23
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2009 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2010 1 (2013) [hereinafter AFCARS JULY
REPORT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport17.pdf.
24
CWLA, supra note 21. There are no provisions in federal foster care law which specifically
address or require states to report missing foster children, nor are there any that require the
federal government to track missing foster children. Id.
25
MICHAEL PERGAMIT & MICHELLE ERNST, RUNNING AWAY FROM FOSTER CARE: YOUTH’S
KNOWLEDGE AND ACCESS OF SERVICES 8 (2011), available at http://www.1800runaway.org/
assets/1/7/NORC_Part_C_Final.pdf.
26
Id.; Todd Wallack, Hundreds May Be Missing in Child Welfare System, BOSTON GLOBE
(Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/2014/02/27/hundreds-kids-maymissing-state-welfare-system/t5qc84Uzd8LWiphMl5ecFP/story.html.
27

LEGAL CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE & EDUC., WHAT CHILD WELFARE ADVOCATES CAN DO FOR
UNACCOMPANIED YOUTH (2008) [hereinafter WELFARE ADVOCATES], available at http://center.
serve.org/nche/downloads/child_wel_uy.pdf.
28
PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25.
29

AFCARS JULY REPORT, supra note 23.
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runaway status. 30 Significantly, 5.5% of the youths ages 14 to 17 in placement
were on runaway status; 31 roughly 8% of all 17-year-olds were on runaway
status. 32 Because these counts were taken on a single day, they underestimate
the percentage of youth who may have run away at some time during that year
or during their entire time in foster care. 33 Also, individual states (and counties)
have different practices for categorizing a child as a runaway. 34 For example,
according to state records, there were zero 17-year-olds on runaway “status” in
New Hampshire on September 30, 2009, but in Texas, 17.4% of all 17-yearolds were on runaway status. 35 Eleven states and the District of Columbia do
not use “runaway” as a reason for official discharge, but in Oregon, 17.2% of
children are discharged as runaways. 36 It is impossible, therefore, to know how
much of the disparity in runaway “rates” is due to real differences in youth
behavior and how much is due to different coding practices. 37 However,
according to this wildly inconsistent data, of all youths discharged from care
during 2009, 2% were discharged due to being on runaway status; 38 3.5% of all
17-year-olds were discharged as runaways. 39
There are also a significant number of minors who should be taken in
to custody by a state’s child welfare system after being kicked out or running
away from home, but who, for various reasons, are not picked up. These youths
fall through the cracks for two primary reasons:
First, child welfare agencies often hesitate to take custody of
older youth. Appropriate placements are scarce, and achieving
permanency is challenging. Second, many unaccompanied
youth strive to avoid entering the child welfare system, due to
loyalty to parents, fear of retribution against themselves or
siblings, unwillingness to relinquish control over their lives, or
mistrust of the child welfare system. 40
A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study found that 46% of
homeless youth left their family’s home (not foster home) because of physical

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
Pergamit, supra note 25, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Welfare Advocates, supra note 27.
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abuse; 17% left because of sexual abuse. 41 Over 50% of young people in
shelters and on the streets report that their parents told them to leave or knew
they were leaving and did not care. 42 Each year, 1.6 to 1.7 million youths run
away or are forced out of their homes by their parents or other caretakers.43
As far as raw numbers regarding foster children who are missing or
have run away, the only data available are from sporadic reports in newspapers
and independent investigations. In 2002, Michigan acknowledged that it had
lost track of 302 foster children. 44 In the 1990s, New York City recorded an
average of 4,000 runaways from foster care per year. 45 Florida acknowledged
648 missing children in 2006. 46 But, again, these are inherently underestimates;
they only include children classified by state governments as “runaways,” and,
as noted, some states do not even use this classification. 47 It does not count all
the children the state cannot physically locate at any given point in time.
Studies by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) indicate higher
raw numbers of runaway and missing foster children than the individual state
and city accounts discussed above. The Vera Institute in New York City found
that of those youths who first enter foster care as adolescents, 40% had at least
one reported “missing” child during their time in care. 48 According to another
study, 46% of 17-year-olds in foster care in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin
reported having run away at some time; 49 in Illinois alone, the rate was 52%. 50
Nearly two-thirds of those who ran away did so more than once. 51 A similar

41

11 Facts About Homeless Teens, DOSOMETHING.ORG, https://www.dosomething.org/facts/
11-facts-about-homeless-teens (last visited Dec. 24, 2014).
42
Id.
43

Welfare Advocates, supra note 27.
Jack Kresnack, Reporting Holds Michigan’s Child Welfare System Accountable, NEIMAN
REP. (June 15, 2004), http://niemanreports.org/articles/reporting-holds-michigans-child-welfaresystem-accountable/.
44

45
TIMOTHY ROSS, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW
YORK CITY’S FOSTER CARE SYSTEM AT THE YEAR 2000 (2001), available at http://www.vera.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/All_Exec_Summaries.pdf.
46
Who’s Looking for Foster Care’s Lost Children, ABC NEWS (June 4, 2006), http://abc
news.go.com/WNT/FosterCare/story?id=2038588.
47
Id.
48
MARNI FINKLESTEIN, VERA INST. OF TECH., YOUTH WHO CHRONICALLY AWOL FROM
FOSTER CARE: WHY THEY RUN, WHERE THEY GO, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 3 (2004), available
at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Foster_AWOLs.pdf.
49
PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25, at 1 (citing MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH
PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE CARE (2004), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/
files/ChapinHallDocument_8.pdf).
50
Id.
51

Id.

CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/21/2015 2:41 PM

CIVIL RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE

1233

study of 17-year-olds in Los Angeles foster care found 36% had run away from
care at least once. 52
According to a 2013 article in The Oklahoman, children in a foster care
shelter are free to leave at any time and “if the child is above the age of 15, or
sometimes if they are above the age of 13 and ‘seem particularly mature,’ the
shelter staff will not follow the child nor will the police be called.” 53 The
National Runaway Safeline has found that less than one quarter of youths are in
touch with their caseworker while on a runaway episode. 54
The National Runaway Safeline’s research also indicates that youths
are both literally and figuratively overlooked by caseworkers. According to
their field work, youth who run away want to see their families more often and
believe that more needs to be done to obviate the effects of being placed away
from their neighborhood, family, and friends. 55 The foster youth they
interviewed reported a strong desire for someone to talk to, someone who will
listen to them and help work through problems. 56 The youths felt that
caseworkers do not provide the support they need and that caseworkers should
visit more often. 57 According to the study, most youths do not hate the system
or blame it for having to remove them from their home; they just want it to
work better. 58
The Vera Institute conducted research which underscores why so many
children stay away after they run.
Youths returning to foster care after an AWOL may not be able
to return to the foster home they left, either because foster
parents will not take them back or because a group home filled
their beds if they were gone for more than three days. For the
youth, losing their bed may mean staying the night at an
emergency placement facility, registering in a new school, and

52

Id. (citing MICHAEL R. PERGAMIT & HEIDI JOHNSON, EXTENDING FOSTER CARE AGE TO 21:
IMPLICATIONS AND ESTIMATES FROM YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE IN LOS ANGELES (2009),
available at http://www.careerladdersproject.org/docs/Final%20Report%20-%20Urban%20
Institute.pdf.).
53

Conna Craig, Protect Foster Children from Sex Trafficking, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/10/23/children-sex-trade-foster-care-column/3153
537/.
54
NAT’L RUNAWAY SAFELINE, http://www.1800runaway.org/learn/research/why_they_run/
foster_fact_sheet/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
55
Id.
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
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caregivers

and

Despite the numbers and consequences of runaways, the Vera Institute
and The National Runaway Safeline are some of the only organizations that
have actually studied the issue in depth and, most importantly, surveyed youth
themselves. According to the Child Welfare League of America, the field has
“a dearth of research on children missing from” 60 out-of-home care—or even
promising practices—“in the prevention of, response to, and resolution of
missing from care episodes.” 61 This is indicative of the overall indifference to
this population.
C. The Disproportionality of Adolescents of Color in Foster Care
Unlike figures on runaways, the disproportionality of minority children
in the foster care system has been well documented and studied.62 In 2008, of
the estimated 399,546 children in foster care, 54% were Black, Hispanic, or
Multiracial. 63 During the same time, only 37% of the general population was
Black, Hispanic, or Multiracial.64 The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services reported in 2003 that although black children accounted for 15% of
the total child population, they made up 25% of victims in substantiated cases
of child maltreatment and 45% of children in foster care. 65 American Indian
children compose 2% of the foster care population, nearly double their rate in
the general population.66 According to the official data, Hispanic children are
59

Finkelstein, supra note 48, at 1.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILDREN MISSING FROM CARE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EXPERT PANEL MEETING 7 (Mar. 8–9, 2004), available at http://66.227.70.18/programs/fostercare/
childmissmtg.pdf.
60

61

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263615.pdf;
CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY AND DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD
WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2009) [hereinafter RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY], available at
http://cjjr.georgetown.edu./pdfs/cjjr_ch_final.pdf; Disproportionate Representation of Children
and Youth of Color, NAT’L RESOURCE CENTER FOR PERMANENCY AND FAM. CONNECTIONS,
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/info_services/disproportionate.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2015).
63
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD
WELFARE (2011) [hereinafter ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY], available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf.
62

64

Eric Kayne, Census: White Majority in U.S. Gone by 2043, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2014,
4:11 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/13/18934111-census-white-majority-inus-gone-by-2043?lite.
65
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY, supra note 62, at 13.
66

Id.
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slightly overrepresented in child welfare, making up 20% of children in care.67
There are also indications that Hispanic children are coming into care at faster
rates than other children. 68
The system’s racial imbalance is most apparent in big cities where
there are sizeable minority and foster care populations, 69 and importantly for
this Article, where prostitution rings predominate. 70 “In Chicago, for example,
95% of children in foster care are black.” 71 “Out of 42,000 children in New
York City’s foster care system at the end of 1997, only 1,300 were white.”72
Black children in New York were ten times as likely as white children to be in
state protective custody. 73 This imbalance is remarkable in states with high
black or other minority populations. For example, 50% of North Carolina’s
foster care population is black. 74 In Minnesota, Native American children make
up a shocking 12% of the foster care population; in Kansas, Nebraska,
Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin, Native American
children make up between 4% and 7% of the general population.75
According to the federal government’s own studies, there are no
statistically significant differences in overall maltreatment rates between
African American and Caucasian families.76 Disturbingly, children and families
of color are treated differently at all points in the child welfare system. 77

67

ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY, supra note 63.
SUSAN W. DOWNS, CHILD WELFARE AND FAMILY SERVICES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (6th
ed. 2000); Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of
Contemporary Foster Care, 14 CHILD., FAM. & FOSTER CARE 1, 79 (2004) (citing CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY
2003 (2003)).
68

69
Dorothy Roberts, Race and Class in the Child Welfare System, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/caseworker/roberts.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015).
70
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION
AND INTERDICTION 33 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf.
71
Roberts, supra note 69.
72
73

Id.
Id.

74
African American Children in Foster Care, CHILD. SERVICES PRAC. NOTES FOR N.C. CHILD
WELFARE WORKERS, May 2001, at 1, available at http://www.practicenotes.org/vol6_no2/cspn%
20v6_2.pdf.
75
ALICIA SUMMERS ET AL., DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER
CARE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 3–4 (2013), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/
default/files/Disproportionality%20Rates%20for%20Children%20of%20Color%20in%20Foster
%20Care%202013.pdf.
76
See CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1
(2006) [hereinafter DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM], available at
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cyf/fostercarecolor.pdf.
77

Id.
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Research shows that families of color, when compared with Caucasian families,
have less contact with child welfare workers, receive fewer services, and are
substantially less likely to receive services in their homes. 78 The children
themselves receive fewer familial visits, fewer contacts with caseworkers,
fewer written case plans, and fewer developmental or psychological
assessments. 79
Of most significance to this Article, black children are placed in foster
care at twice the rate for white children. 80 Instead of being referred to foster
care, 72% of Caucasian children are served in their homes, while only 40% of
Hispanic/Latino children and 44% of African American children receive inhome services. 81 Two recent studies measured African American to white
placement disparity among children of different age groups in different regions
and found that disparity increased for teens over time across all areas; in other
words, black adolescents across the nation are placed in foster care at the
highest rates. 82 Once in foster care, the median length of stay for black children
is 80% longer, with an average stay of 18 months as compared to 10 months for
white children.83 African American children also experience substantially more
moves while in foster care as compared to Caucasian children.84
African American children are also less likely than children of other
races to be reunited with their families. 85 Five major studies in the 1990s, and
one in 2005, led to the same conclusion: that Caucasian children are reunited
with their families at four times the rate of African American children.86 This
analysis found race continued to be a strong predictor of reunification, even
after controlling for other factors: age of entry, parental job skills, parental

78
Id. (citing DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE U.S. CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM: DOCUMENTATION, RESEARCH ON CAUSES, AND PROMISING PRACTICES (2002),
available at http://www.familyandchildwellbeing.com/images/Minority_Overrepresentation_in_
Child_Welfare_-_Dorothy_Roberts_AECF_Paper.pdf).
79

Id. (citing ROBERT B. HILL, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD
WELFARE: AN UPDATE (2006), available at http://www.cssp.org/publications/child-welfare/
alliance/synthesis-of-research-on-disproportionality-robert-hill.pdf).
80
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2003 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2006 (2006), available at www.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/cb/afcarsreport10.pdf.
81

DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
FRED WULCZYN & BRIDGETTE LERY, CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., RACIAL DISPARITY IN
FOSTER CARE ADMISSIONS (2007), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old_
reports/399.pdf.
82

83

DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
Id. (citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SAFETY,
PERMANENCY & WELL-BEING CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES (1999)).
85
Id.
84

86

Id.
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substance abuse problems, and services provided to caretaker. 87 One study also
demonstrated that children of color, particularly African American children,
who are legally available for adoption wait longer to be adopted.88
Older children of color in foster care also seem to receive fewer
independent living services care. Of 98,561 youth receiving independent living
services in 2011, the majority of these young adults were white, 32% were
African American, and 20% were Hispanic. 89 All of these factors—fewer
reunification services, longer stays in foster care, slower adoptions, and less
access to independent living resources—contribute to the crises facing
adolescents of color aging out of care 90 and in particular to their vulnerability to
sexual exploitation.
D. Projections Regarding Minority Adolescents in Foster Care
According to the latest U.S. Census, for the first time, America’s racial
and ethnic minorities now make up about half of the under-five age group. 91
Fueled by immigration and high rates of birth, particularly among Hispanics,
whites have already fallen to a minority among babies. 92 The government also
projects that in five years, minorities will make up more than half of children
under 18. 93 The fastest percentage growth is among multiracial Americans,
followed by Asians and Hispanics. Non-Hispanic whites make up 63% of the
United States; Hispanics, 17%; blacks, 12.3%; Asians, 5%; and multiracial
Americans, 2.4%. 94 About 40% of whites age 25 to 29 graduate from college,
compared with 15% for Latinos and 23% for blacks. 95 “‘More so than ever, we
need to recognize the importance of young minorities for the growth and
vitality of our labor force and economy,’ said William H. Frey, a demographer
at the Brookings Institution who analyzed the census data.” 96
In terms of the child welfare system, the percentage of Hispanics in
foster care increased by 1% from 2009 to 2010, and has held steady at 21% for

87

Id.

88

Id.
NAT’L YOUTH IN TRANSITION DATABASE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM STATE REPORTS TO THE
NATIONAL YOUTH IN TRANSITION DATABASE, FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 4 (2012), available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/nytd_data_brief_1.pdf.
89

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See infra Part II.
Kayne, supra note 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the past three years. 97 Also significant, “Non-Hispanic multiple race groups”
and “race unknown” children have each increased by 1% since 2008, and have
remained at 6% and 3% respectively. 98 This has serious implications for the
make-up of foster care in the next generation.
There are also implications of these population changes in foster care
for the next decade. According to the AFCARS, Hispanic children make up
23% of the population waiting to be adopted, which means that if they are not,
they will age out of care as adolescents in the near future. 99 Unknown and
multiple race children make up 9% and Native American 2% of the population
waiting to be adopted, all out of proportion to their populations in foster care
rolls. 100 If these children do not get adopted, which is increasingly unlikely as
they get older, 101 they will be out on their own before they know it and
certainly before they are ready.
III.

THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE

Adolescents in foster care face heartbreaking futures. 102 In particular,
shocking numbers of children become victims of sexual exploitation while in
the custody of the state or shortly after planned discharge. Caseworkers, judges,
and lawyers know this tragic truth all too well from their daily practices.103

97

Children in Foster Care by Race and Hispanic Origin, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6246-children-in-foster-care-by-race-and-hispanicorigin?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/868,867,133,38,35/2638,2601,2600,2598,2603,2597,2
602,1353/12992,12993 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
98
Id.
99
100

AFCARS NOV. REPORT, supra note 4.
Id.

101
N. AM. COUNCIL ON ADOPTABLE CHILDREN, IT’S TIME TO MAKE OLDER CHILD ADOPTION A
REALITY: BECAUSE EVERY CHILD AND YOUTH DESERVES A FAMILY 1 (2009), available at
http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/MakeOlderChildAdoptionReality.pdf.
102
The tragic outcomes of youths aging out of foster care have been well documented and will
not be detailed here. These outcomes include extremely high rates of homelessness,
unemployment, incarceration, failure to finish high school or college, and early pregnancy. See,
e.g., LUCY A. BILARER & MARK E. COURTNEY, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY,
SCIENCE SAYS RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 27: FOSTER CARE YOUTH 2 (2006), available at https://the
nationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primary-download/ss27_fostercare.pdf; TIME
FOR REFORM, supra note 11; Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster
Youth, CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwestevaluation-adult-functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
103
Josh Kovner, Out of the Shadows: Sex-Trafficking a Threat to Runaway Connecticut Teens,
HARTFORD CURRENT (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-childtrafficking-exploitation-p-1214-20141212-story.html?track=rss#page=1; Elissa Nadworny, FBI,
Social Workers Unite To Attack Sexual Trafficking of Children, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 3,
2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/nation-world/article2600436.html.
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A. Sexual Exploitation of Youth in the United States
An estimated 300,000 to 400,000 children are sexually exploited every
year in the United States. 104 The most frequent age of entry into commercial
sex industry in the United States is 12 years old. 105 The overwhelming majority
of these youth have run away or been kicked out (“throwaways”) of their
homes or foster care placement. 106 According to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, in 1999, 1,682,900 youths had a period of time in which
they could be characterized as a runaway or throwaway youth; 71% of these
youth were considered at risk for prostitution. 107 One in three teens will be
recruited by a pimp within 48 hours of leaving home, 108 and one out of three
homeless teens do, in fact, resort to prostitution. 109
It is extremely difficult to count raw numbers of sexually exploited
youth. 110 There is wide disparity among police reports, social service

104
See MICHELLE LILLIE, OLP FOUNDATION & HUMANTRAFFICKINGSEARCH.NET, AN UNHOLY
ALLIANCE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 2 (2013),
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/humtrafcon5/4/; Child Trafficking and Sexual
Exploitation of Children, THORN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.wearethorn.org/child-traffickingexploitation-in-the-united-states/; William Adam et al., Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Effects of
Federal Legislation on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND
DELINQ. PREVENTION (July 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228631.pdf; OFFICE OF
JUST. PROGRAMS, http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_humantrafficking.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015).
105
NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
STATISTICS, available at http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/NSAC11_Handouts/NSAC11_
Handout_With_Statistics.pdf; Protecting Vulnerable Children: Preventing and Addressing Sex
Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th
Cong. (2013) (testimony of John D. Ryan, Chief Executive Officer, The National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children).
106
One study estimates 30% of shelter youth and 70% of street youth are victims of
commercial sexual exploitation; they engage in or are coerced into prostitution for “survival sex”
to meet daily needs for food, shelter, or drugs. See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH POL’Y, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE
U.S., CANADA, AND MEXICO 131 (2001); see also J. M. Greene et al., Prevalence and Correlates
of Survival Sex Among Runaway and Homeless Youth, 89 AM. J. PUB. 1406, 1406 (1999).
107
HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN
TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2009),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/.
108

HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 105.
CASE Campaign Against Sexually Exploitation, NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
CHILD ABUSE, http://www.ndaa.org/ncpca_case_campaign.html/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
110
MICHELLE STRANSKY & DAVID FINELHOR, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR.,
HOW MANY JUVENILES ARE INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION IN THE U.S.? (2008), available at
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/prostitution/Juvenile_Prostitution_factsheet.pdf; see also DEBORAH
BOYER, CITY OF SEATTLE HUMAN SERVS. DIV., WHO PAYS THE PRICE?: ASSESSMENT OF YOUTH
109
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observations, and global estimates; 111 prostitution is clandestine and universally
under-reported. 112 A 2008 report in Seattle found that 300 to 500 children were
involved in prostitution in the Seattle/King County area. 113 In New York City,
estimates are even higher at 2,200 youths being commercially sexually
exploited. 114 Arrest numbers are also shocking considering they only take into
account youth who have been found by police and are reasonably suspected of
prostitution. Furthermore, according to federal law, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) 115 passed in 2000, minors are not even supposed to be
arrested at all for prostitution by any law enforcement agency in the country. 116
Despite this, in California, 804 children were arrested for prostitution in the
year 2010 and 363 in Texas. 117
Youth of color make up the majority of sexually exploited minors. In
Los Angeles, 38% of youth under the age of 18 arrested for prostitution-related
offenses identified as non-white (primarily African American).118 Other
research conducted on a subpopulation of exploited minors shows that African
American girls and women are arrested in prostitution at a far higher rate than
girls and women of other races involved in the same activity. 119 African
American females are also sexually exploited at a younger age on average than
other children. 120 In a Los Angeles study, 92% of all victims of sexual

INVOLVEMENT IN PROSTITUTION IN SEATTLE (2008), available at http://www.seattle.gov/human
services/domesticviolence/Report_YouthInProstitution.pdf.
111
112

BOYER, supra note 110.
STRANSKY & FINELHOR, supra note 110.

113

BOYER, supra note 110.
RIC CURTIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1 THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
225083.pdf.
114

115

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193,
117 Stat. 2875; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109164, 119 Stat. 3562; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044. TVPA states that sex trafficking of children occurs when anyone under
the age of 18 is induced to perform a “commercial sex act,” which is defined as “any sex act on
account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.”
116
CLAWSON, supra note 107.
117
BRENDA ZURITA, BEVERLY LAHAYE INST., CHILDREN IN PROSTITUTION (2012), available at
http://www.cwfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CWA_Decriminalization-of-Prostitution-forMinors2012.pdf.
118
KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2010
(2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd10/preface.pdf?.
119
CLAWSON, supra note 107 (citing R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE PROSTITUTION OF WOMEN AND
GIRLS (1998)).
120
KATE WALKER, CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, ENDING THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A CALL FOR MULTI-SYSTEM COLLABORATION IN CALIFORNIA 19
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exploitation identified as African American.121 According to another study of
all reported trafficking cases, 21% of victims identified as Hispanic.122
Females make up the overwhelming majority of those exploited; a
2011 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on the characteristics of
suspected human trafficking incidents stated that almost 95% of sex trafficking
victims were female.123 Young girls are also much more likely to be arrested
for prostitution—one study found that girls under the age of 18 were over 14
times more likely to be arrested for prostitution than their male peers.124
One reason, relevant to this Article, that young women are so much
more likely to become sexually exploited than males is that it has been well
documented that females in foster care are more likely to run away. 125
Moreover, national studies have shown that 75% of all runaways are female. 126
However, male runaways from foster care and from home are also at high risk
for sexual exploitation, particularly those who identify as LGBTQ. The primary
reason is that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in the homeless youth
population. 127
Data collection on this population has been difficult for a
number of reasons; many youth do not self-disclose their
sexual orientation or gender identity out of fear of harassment
and/or discrimination, many providers harbor bias against
LGBTQ youth, do not question youth about their identities,

(2013), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/publications/EndingCSEC-A-Call-for-Multi-System_Collaboration-in-CA.pdf.
121
Chelsea Parsons et al., 3 Key Challenges in Combating the Sex Trafficking of Minors in the
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2014), available at https://www.american
progress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2014/04/08/87293/3-key-challenges-in-combating-the-sex-traffic
king-of-minors-in-the-united-states/.
122
See id.
123
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children/Sex Trafficking, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/CSECSexTrafficking.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2015).
124
NEIL BERNSTEIN & LISA K. FOSTER, VOICES FROM THE STREET: A SURVEY OF HOMELESS
YOUTH BY THEIR PEERS (2008), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/08/08-004.pdf.
125
PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25, at 5–6.
126
Homeless and Runaway Youth, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/homeless-and-runaway-youth.aspx.
127
ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING SHELTER: THE EXPERIENCES AND
UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH (2013), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/LGBTHomelessYouth.pdf.
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and/or are not trained in developing trusting relationships with
LGBTQ youth. 128
However, a recent survey reported that about 40% of homeless youth identify
as LGBTQ, identifying that they are homeless because of family rejection due
to their sexual orientation or gender identification. 129 This same report found
that more than 40% of agencies serving homeless youth do not address issues
related to this rejection.130 Another study uncovered that a disproportionate
number of male youth held in detention by police for prostitution identify as
gay, bisexual, or questioning; only 1% of heterosexual boys are detained for
prostitution compared with 10% of their gay, bisexual, or questioning peers. 131
“Many homeless youth engage in survival sex (exchanging sex for food,
shelter, clothing, etc.),” 132 and this is particularly common for LGBTQ youths.
One study found that LGBTQ “youth were three times more likely to engage in
survival sex as compared to their homeless heterosexual counterparts.” 133
B. Sexual Exploitation of Adolescents in Foster Care
There is an extremely strong correlation between sexual exploitation
and involvement with the child welfare system. 134 First of all, as discussed in

128

Bernadette Brown, The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of LGBTQ Youth, NAT’L COUNCIL
CRIME & DELINQ. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://nccdglobal.org/blog/the-commercial-sexualexploitation-of-lgbtq-youth.
129
LAURE E. DURSO & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST. WITH TRUE COLORS FUND AND
PALETTE FUND, SERVING OUR YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE
PROVIDERS WORKING WITH LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH WHO ARE
HOMELESS OR AT RISK OF BECOMING HOMELESS 4 (2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Durso-Gates-LGBT-Homeless-Youth-Survey-July-2012.pdf.
Again, this means these youths should be taken in by child welfare.
130
Id.
ON

131

Angela Irvine, “We’ve Had Three of Them”: Addressing the Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Gender Non-Conforming Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 675, 694 (2010).
132
BROWN, supra note 128.
133

See id. (citing NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST.,
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS (2006)).
134

Michelle Lillie, An Unholy Alliance: The Connection Between Foster Care and Human
Trafficking, HUMANTRAFFICKINGSEARCH.NET (Oct. 24, 2013), http://humantraffickingsearch.net/
wp/an-unholy-alliance-the-connection-between-foster-care-and-human-trafficking/ [hereinafter
An Unholy Alliance]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70; Prevention of the
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Foster Children, YOUNG MINDS ADVOCACY PROJECT,
http://www.youngmindsadvocacy.org/csec-2/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter YOUNG
MINDS]; Malika Saada Saar, Stopping the Foster Care to Child Trafficking Pipeline, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malika-saada-saar/stopping-thefoster-care-_b_4170483.html.
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Section II, thousands of children run away from foster care each year, and
runaways are susceptible to sexual exploitation. Foster youth are even more
susceptible. Children who have been involved with the system are the main
target of the criminals seeking children to exploit.135 The high correlation of
children with a history of abuse and sexual exploitation is also due to a number
of risk factors including, “early trauma history, dangerous environments, lack
of supportive caregiving, and severe mental health.”136
According to one study, 98% of children who are identified as
survivors of sex trafficking had previous involvement with child welfare
services. 137 More conservatively, the National Center for Exploited Children
reports that 60% of runaway children who are sexually exploited had
involvement with the child welfare system. 138 Half of the sexually exploited
children in California were placed in foster care or a group home at some point
in their life. 139 The percentages are even higher in certain areas of the state. A
study in the Bay Area revealed that over 75% of the sexually exploited youths
were victims of abuse or neglect. 140 Los Angeles reports 61% of sexually
exploited victims were in foster care and 80% of the girls had child welfare
involvement. 141 In New York City, 75% of sexually exploited children were in
foster care. 142
In terms of raw numbers, which as discussed are extremely difficult to
obtain, 143 we are aware of 14,900 foster youth who were sexually assaulted

135

YOUNG MINDS, supra note 134; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 31;
Kovner, supra note 103 (“Trafficking of children for sex . . . was, and is, happening in
Connecticut, and is as simple as a girl, or even a boy, running away from a foster home or
somewhere else and bumping, literally, into a pimp trolling the mall or the park for just such a
target.”).
136
DANNA BASSON ET AL., WESTCOAST CHILDREN’S CLINIC, RESEARCH TO ACTION: SEXUALLY
EXPLOITED MINORS (SEM) NEEDS AND STRENGTHS 11 (2012), available at http://www.westcoast
cc.org/WCC_SEM_Needs-and-Strengths_FINAL.pdf.
137
Sex Trafficking and Exploitation in America: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th
Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Joette Katz, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Children
and Families).
138
Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Louise M. Slaughter, United
States Rep. from New York).
139

An Unholy Alliance, supra note 134.
KATE WALKER, CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: THE
INTERSECTION WITH CHILD WELFARE, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/BTB_
XXII_IIH_10.pdf.
140

141

Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (testimony of Karen Bass, United States Rep.
from California) [hereinafter Bass].
142
LILLIE, supra note 104, at 2.
143

STRANSKY & FINELHOR, supra note 110, at 1.
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during their time as a runaway. 144 Also, 1,700 foster children are known to have
prostituted in order to receive things such as food, shelter, or drugs. 145
Sexual exploitation does not only result when children run away from
foster care, but also when they age out of care. 146 Children aging out of foster
care become homeless at alarming rates, and, as discussed, all homeless youth
are at high risk for sexual exploitation. The National Alliance to End
Homelessness reports that 11% to 37% of all children aging out of care deal
with homelessness and an additional 25% to 50% are unstably housed. 147 The
United States Interagency Council on Homelessness reports that within four
years of exiting the system, 25% of children will be homeless. 148 This is critical
because 75% of all sexually exploited victims report being homeless.149
Reports have shown that youth need only be on the street for no longer than
seven days before they are at a higher risk of sexual exploitation. 150 The City of
Seattle alone estimates that there are between 700 and 1,000 homeless youth on
any given night. 151 A 1999 report found that 40% of “persons in federally
funded homeless shelters were former foster youth.” 152 In Massachusetts, a
2005 Census of homeless young adults ages 18 through 24, found that 25%
were former foster care youth. 153 A California study found that 65% of former
foster care youths age out without secured housing. 154

144

LILLIE, supra note 104, at 10.

145

Id.
See id. at 11.

146
147

Mindy Mitchell, HUD Report Explores Options for Youth Aging Out of Foster Care,
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (June 2, 2014), http://www.endhomelessness.org/blog/
entry/hud-report-explores-options-for-youth-aging-out-of-foster-care#.VHTz-VfF9RE.
148
Opening Doors: Homelessness Among Youth, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
HOMELESSNESS,
http://usich.gov/usich_resources/fact_sheets/opening_doors_homelessness_
among_youth/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
149

LILLIE, supra note 104, at 11.
NAT’L COAL. TO PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION, NATIONAL PLAN TO
PREVENT THE SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 5 (2012), available at
http://www.preventtogether.org/Resources/Documents/NationalPlan2012FINAL.pdf.
150

151
Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Melinda Giovengo, Executive
Director, YouthCare).
152
Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth’s Substantive Due Process
Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 387 (2005).
153
MASS. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, 18 AND OUT: LIFE AFTER
FOSTER CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 13 (2005), available at http://www.chapa.org/sites/default/
files/qwert_16.pdf.
154
CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF THE HOUSING NEEDS OF
EMANCIPATED FOSTER/PROBATION YOUTH 6 (2002), available at http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/
res/pdf/rptonthehousingneeds.pdf.
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Youth who have already been discharged from foster care, or who are
well aware that they will be kicked out of their group or foster homes the day
their foster care check stops coming, are perfect prey for pimps. In the words of
the DOJ:
Pimps . . . manipulate children into a life of prostitution and
then use physical and emotional abuse to keep their victims
trapped in that way of life. Pimps target children who are
vulnerable to exploitation, including those with low selfesteem, who are runaways or throwaways, and who have
histories of physical and sexual abuse. Pimps typically recruit a
vulnerable child by first showing affection and attention and
promising a stable relationship. . . . After the child has been
manipulated into a relationship with the pimp, the pimp begins
training or “seasoning” her by normalizing the life of
prostitution and making her completely dependent on him. . . .
To solidify his control, the pimp . . . will beat, torture, or starve
the child to force her into obedience. Some pimps use alcohol
or drugs to control their victims. To manipulate the child, the
pimp also uses emotional tactics such as renaming her to break
down her identity and telling her that she has no value except
as a prostitute. The pimp also separates the child from
biological family and friends as well as anything familiar.
Additionally, the pimp keeps all of the profit earned by the
child and delivers violent punishment if the child withholds
any money. The pimp uses a combination of praise and abuse
that causes the child to constantly work for his affection. The
child becomes completely dependent on the pimp for food,
clothing, shelter, and attention. The pimp’s control often is so
complete that victims are incapable of leaving. 155

IV.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Adolescents in Foster Care Are in State Custody
1. Federal Law: Title IV-E Foster Care
A child can only be placed in long-term foster care by court order
granting the state physical and legal custody. 156 State laws and regulations

155
156

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 31–32.

42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013) (making “a judicial determination to the effect that
continuation in the home from which removed would be contrary to the welfare of the child” a
prerequisite for removal and placement into foster care). For a sample of states with similar
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govern foster care, with each state having its own unique system. 157 However,
foster care is also regulated and funded at the federal level, primarily by Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act. 158 A state’s funding from the federal
government is conditioned on providing all children in foster care with certain
case management services.159 Each child is entitled to a case plan which details
their “permanency plan” and the services and care needed to help them achieve
that goal. 160 There are only five possible permanency goals: return to parent,
adoption, legal guardianship, permanent placement with a fit and willing
relative, and “another planned permanent living arrangement” (APPLA). 161
APPLA is the category states use when they discharge youth to their own legal
custody after turning 18. 162 No adolescent in foster care can be discharged to
their own legal custody before the age of 18.163 Under federal law, permanency
plans for all adolescents in foster care age 16 and older, regardless of receiving

provisions, see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-908B (2014) (“A local department or a licensed childplacing agency shall have authority pursuant to a court order to place a child over whom it has
legal custody in a permanent foster care placement where the child shall remain until attaining
majority or thereafter, until the age of twenty-one years . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.201(a)(2)
(2014) (“If the court finds that the child is in need of protection or services or neglected and in
foster care, it shall enter an order making any of the following dispositions of the case: . . . (2)
transfer legal custody to one of the following: (i) a child-placing agency; or (ii) the responsible
social services agency. In making a foster care placement for a child whose custody has been
transferred under this subdivision, the agency shall make an individualized determination of how
the placement is in the child’s best interests using the consideration for relatives and the best
interest factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b) . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 431307 (2014) (“Each court which has placed a child in foster care shall send to the office (a) a
copy of the plan or permanency plan, prepared by the person or court in charge of the child in
accordance with section 43-1312, to effectuate rehabilitation of the foster child and family unit or
permanent placement of the child and (b) a copy of the progress reports as they relate to the plan
or permanency plan, including, but not limited to, the court order and the report and
recommendations of the guardian ad litem.”).
157
See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 (2014); CAL. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN &
FAMILIES, UNDERSTANDING THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA (2002), available at
http://www.ccrwf.org/pdf/ChildWelfarePrimer.pdf; W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES.,
FOSTER CARE POLICY (2014), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/bcf/children_adult/foster/
policy/FCPolicyJuly2014.pdf; NYS Law and Regulations, NYSCCC, http://nysccc.org/fostercare/
legal-issues/nys-foster-care-laws-and-regulation/ (last modified Feb. 4, 2015).
158
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500.
Foster care is currently authorized by Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended, and
implemented under the Code of Federal Regulations. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1355 (2014).
159

42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2013) (“Requisite features of State plan”).
Id. §§ 671(a)(15)(C), (E), 675(1)(E) (defining “case plan” to include, among other things, a
“permanency plan”).
161
Id. § 675(5)(C).
160

162

Id. In each of the other goals, the legal custodian is either a biological parent, an adoptive
parent, a legal guardian, or relative with legal custody. Id. § 675(2).
163

Id. § 675(5)(H).
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their permanency plan, must include an independent living and transitioning
plan with a written description of the programs and services that will help
prepare the child for independence. 164
Until 2011, states could only claim IV-E reimbursements for children
under age 18, or age 19 if the child was still in school.165 The Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (FCA), 166 and as
amended in 2011, 167 made a number of changes to Title IV-E to address the
needs of adolescents in and aging out of foster care. 168 FCA promotes the
extension of foster care beyond 18, and conditions federal funding on ensuring
that each adolescent has a coordinated transition plan, including health care,
living arrangements, and employment or education plans. 169 States can seek
reimbursement for children up to age 21 who are (1) completing high school or
an equivalent program, (2) enrolled in a post-secondary or vocation education
program, (3) participating in a program designed to promote or remove barriers
to employment, (4) employed at least 80 hours per month, or (5) exempt from
the above qualifiers based on medical conditions.170 FCA also provides options
that states may elect to improve outcomes for youth in and leaving foster
care. 171

164

Id. § 675(1)(D).
See Child Welfare Policy Manual § 8.3A, CHILD. BUREAU, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/
programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=8.
166
Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949. The Fostering Connections Act also amended other
parts of the Social Security Act, including Title IV-B, which authorizes federal funding for
certain child welfare services. I am focusing primarily on Title IV-E of the Social Security Act in
this Article.
167
H.R. 2883, 112th Cong. (2011). On September 20, 2011, the Child and Family Services
Improvement and Innovation Act, reauthorizing Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, was
signed into law. Among the many important provisions of the Act, it provides clarification to a
critical element of the education stability provisions of the Fostering Connections Act.
168
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-347, FOSTER CARE: HHS NEEDS TO
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF FOSTERING CONNECTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2014) [hereinafter
GAO-14-347], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663655.pdf. See generally May Shin,
Note, A Saving Grace? The Impact of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing
Adoptions Act on America’s Older Foster Youth, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 133 (2012).
165

169
170
171

Eyster & Looney, supra note 5.
Id.

See GAO-14-347, supra note 168, at 4. Other options include: (1) authorizing states to
provide and receive federal reimbursement for some kinship guardianship assistance payments,
id.; (2) allowing states to waive on a case-by-case basis non safety licensing standards for relative
foster families, id. at 34; (3) authorizing HHS to share information from the Federal Parent
Locator Service with child welfare agencies for Title IV-E purposes, id. at 4; (4) authorizing the
use of foster care maintenance payments to cover the cost of reasonable travel expenses to enable
the child to remain in the school where the child was enrolled at time of placement, id. at 5; (5)
allowing extended eligibility for Chafee Foster Care Independence Program Services to youth
who exit foster care to adoption or kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 42; and (6)
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A separate federal law, The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act 172
(Chafee) was passed in 1999 to address the growing crisis of youth aging out of
care. 173 It provides grants to states, apart from their Title IV-E funds, to create
programs that support adolescents discharging from foster care. Chafee
provides states with “flexible funding” to “enable programs to be designed and
conducted” to assist former foster youth.174 All states provide some extended
services to young people 18 and older; however, the level of services varies
dramatically among states. Some states, such as Iowa, provide robust postfoster care services, while others provide very little support.175
2. State Law Regarding Adolescents in Foster Care
All states receive federal funding for foster care 176 and are therefore
supposed to comply with Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. According to
federal law, as discussed above, states cannot release children to themselves
(i.e., their own legal custody) until they are at least age 18. 177 Since the passage
of the Fostering Care Connections Act, 24 states now allow adolescents to
remain in foster care past age 18, 178 in some cases until age 21. 179 In states that
extend foster care, youth who are discharged to themselves may later reenter

authorizing an extended eligibility for education and training vouchers to youth who exit foster
care to kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 5.
172
Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1882 (1999).
173
145 Cong. Rec. H12846.01 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nancy Johnson)
(“This bill will provide, for the first time, realistic support for our most unfortunate children,
those who have been in foster care for many years and who reach adulthood essentially alone.”).
174
42 U.S.C. § 677(a) (2013).
175
See GAO-14-347, supra note 168, at 12. For an overview on how states have used and
enacted this grant to provide education and training programs to former foster youth, see ROBIN
NIXON & MARIA GARIN JONES, NAT’L FOSTER CARE COAL. & CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE
CHAFEE EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING VOUCHER (ETV) PROGRAM: SIX STATES’ EXPERIENCES
(2007), available at http://www.issuelab.org/resource/chafee_educational_and_training_
voucher_program_six_states_experiences.
176

Title IV-E Foster Care, CHILD. BUREAU (May 17, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
cb/resource/title-ive-foster-care.
177

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D) (2013).
Young People Leave Foster Care to a Family, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES
INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/young-people-leave-foster-care-family (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015).
178

179

See Progress in the States, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE,
http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/progress-states (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) States have either
chosen to allow children over age 18 to remain legally in foster care under all five eligibility
conditions described (CA, OR, TX, ND, MN, AR, IL, IN, MI, AL, PA, MD, DC, NY, RI, MA,
ME), extended foster care under some of the eligibility conditions (TN, WA, WV), or have
passed legislation in connection with the Fostering Connections Act and have an extension plan
in development (NE, HI, CT). Id.
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care. 180 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS)
instructions implementing the FCA permit states to extend foster care that
either permits youth to remain in “care continuously or leave foster care and
return . . . at some point after attaining age 18,” as long as the original court
order remains in effect and other IV-E eligibility criteria are satisfied.181
B. Recent Legislation Addressing Sexual Exploitation
In 2014, the sexual exploitation of foster children gained congressional
recognition with unanimous passage of H.R. 4980, the Preventing Sex
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (PSTSF). 182 “[T]he child welfare
system as a whole has not truly recognized trafficking as a crisis within the
foster youth population,” said House of Representatives member Karen Bass, a
co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Foster Youth and an original cosponsor of H.R. 4058, during debate on the Bill. 183 According to Bass, child
welfare case workers have not been adequately trained and prepared to identify
or respond to child victims of trafficking. 184 Further, certain child welfare
policies may have unintentional negative effects on the well-being of the
children it is meant to protect.185 The Bill’s cosponsors acknowledged that
some foster care regulations inadvertently increase the foster child’s isolation
and separation from friends, family and the surrounding community, resulting
in an increased vulnerability to victimization.186
Title I of the Preventing Sex Trafficking Act amends Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act by requiring each state to develop policies and procedures
for identifying, documenting, and determining appropriate services for any
child or youth in care who the state has reasonable cause to believe is, or is at
risk of being, a victim of sex trafficking or a severe form of trafficking in
persons. 187 Not later than two years after September 29, 2014, states are

180

42 U.S.C § 675(8)(B)(iii)–(iv). They may reenter care until they reach the state’s oldest
allowable age for foster care, assuming they still meet the state’s elected eligibility conditions. Id.
181

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
PROGRAM INSTRUCTION 5 (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pi
1011.pdf.
182
Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat. 1919 (2014).
183
184

Bass, supra note 141.
Id.

185
Prevent Trafficking, COMMITTEE ON WAYS
preventtrafficking/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).

AND

MEANS, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/

186
Id. Some rules make it difficult for foster youth to participate in sports, sleep over at a
friend’s house, obtain a driver’s license, get a part-time job, or engage in other age-appropriate
activities.
187
Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat. 1919 (2013). This occurs in consultation with an
organization experienced in dealing with at risk youth. Id. § 101.
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expected to report of instances of sex trafficked foster youth. 188 By September
29, 2017, this data is to be included in the adoptions and foster care analysis
and reporting system (AFCRS). 189 By September 29, 2018, this data must be
reported to Congress and be publically available on the HHS website.190
PSTSF also requires states to develop and implement plans to
expeditiously locate any child who has run away from care. 191 Similarly, it
directs state agencies to immediately report missing or abducted children or
youth to law enforcement authorities for entry into the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.192 No
later than two years after enactment, using the data reported under AFCARS,
HHS must report to Congress on the children who run away from foster care
and their risk of becoming victims of sex trafficking. 193 The report must include
characteristics of the children who run away and risk factors associated with
children running away from care and summarize the state’s efforts to provide
specialized services placement options to child victims of sex trafficking. 194
The report must also include efforts on behalf of the state to ensure that
children in care form and maintain long-lasting connections to caring adults.195
Title II of the Act requires states to support “normalcy” 196 for foster
children and extends adoption incentives. Normalcy includes implementing a
“reasonable and prudent parent standard” for decisions made by foster parents
or designated officials at foster care institutions. Caregivers are required to be
trained in age or developmentally appropriate “reasonable and prudent parent
standards.” 197 The goal is to enable the caregivers to make parental decisions
that “maintain the health, safety and best interest of the child” while promoting
the child’s participation in “extracurricular, enrichment, cultural and social
activities.” 198 In other words, the statute seems to be attempting to make foster
care as “normal” as possible for adolescents.

188
Id. The text specifically states, “not later than . . . 2 years after such date of enactment.” Id.
The date of enactment was September 29, 2014. Id.
189
Id. § 103.
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
Id. § 104.
Id.
Id. § 105.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 111.
Id.
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Title II of the Act also eliminates “Another Planned Permanent Living
Arrangement” (APPLA) as a permanency goal for children under age 16 199 and
requires additional case plan and case review requirements for youth over 16
with a goal of APPLA. 200 This Act also empowers foster children age 14 and
older to help develop or revise their own case plans.201
These provisions are a step in the right direction toward combatting the
sexual exploitation of youth in foster care. But it is not clear how the reporting
directives will be enforced202 and whether state agencies and workers will have
any incentive to be truthful and meticulous. Likewise, there is no statutory
incentive to address and prevent actual sexual exploitation. 203 Federal funding
is not conditioned on receipt of the states’ reports or on any other
benchmarks. 204
There is also no threat of withholding funding if states continue to use
the APPLA goal; 205 in fact, APPLA is still permitted for children over age 16
and for children under age 16 if the state agency documents “intensive,
ongoing and unsuccessful efforts for family placement.” 206 At this point, it is
hard to foresee this legislation making an immediate or substantial dent in the
hundreds of thousands of youth who are currently sexually exploited, at least
not without concurrent forms of accountability. It is important to note as well
that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 207 landmark legislation

199
Id. § 112(a)(1). APPLA is amended by inserting “only in the case of a child who has
attained 16 years of age” to section 475(5)(C)(i). Id.
200
Id. § 112(b)(1). In order for APPLA to remain a child’s permanency goal, the state agency
must document intensive, ongoing, and unsuccessful efforts for family placement, including
efforts to locate biological family members using search technologies (including social media).
At each permanency hearing, the agency is required to ask the child about the child’s desired
permanency outcome and to make a judicial determination explaining why APPLA is still the
best permanency plan and why it is not in the best interest of the child to be returned home,
adopted, placed with a legal guardian, or placed with a fit and willing relative. At each
permanency hearing, the agency is also required to specify the steps the agency is taking to
ensure the reasonable and prudent parent standard is being followed and that the child has
regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in age or developmentally appropriate activities.
201
Id. § 113 (“Empowering Foster Children Age 14 and Older in the Development of Their
Own Case Plan and Transition Planning for a Successful Adulthood”).
202
See generally id. The law requires various different reporting measures, but prescribes no
enforcement provisions other than requiring that the HHS report to Congress the numbers
reported.
203

Id. The law simply requires states to report instances of sex trafficking to both the law
enforcement authorities and the AFCARS and to respond and locate children who have run away
from foster care.
204
Id. § 102.
205
206
207

Id. § 475A.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
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passed in 2000 208 and reauthorized with amendments in 2003, 2005, 2008, and
2013, has provisions specifically targeted to addressing the problem of
domestic sexual exploitation of minors, 209 and the problem has only gotten
worse since 2013. 210 Other federal laws have also had little effect.211

208

Current Federal Laws, POLARIS, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policyadvocacy/national-policy/current-federal-laws (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (“The Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) is the cornerstone of federal human trafficking
legislation, and established several methods of prosecuting traffickers, preventing human
trafficking, and protecting victims and survivors of trafficking. The act establishes human
trafficking and related offenses as federal crimes, and attaches severe penalties to them. It also
mandates restitution be paid to victims of human trafficking. It further works to prevent
trafficking by establishing the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, which is
required to publish a Trafficking In Persons (TIP) report each year.”).
209
See, e.g., Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations,
ALLIANCE TO END SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING, http://endslaveryandtrafficking.org/fy2014/
Relevant-Authorization-Statutes.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). TVPA recognized that modernday slavery takes place in the context of fraud and coercion, as well as force, and defines “a
commercial sex act [as one that] is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age.” 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2013).
The TVPA seeks to combat trafficking by promoting a policy of “3 Ps”:
prosecution, protection, and prevention: Prosecution involves passing the
appropriate laws that criminalize trafficking, and jailing the abusers who
exploit other humans for profit. Protection involves identifying victims,
providing them with medical care and shelter (and if necessary witness
protection), and, when appropriate, repatriating them. Prevention involves
raising awareness of the inhumane practices involved in the trafficking trade
and promoting a paradigm shift that seeks to reduce the demand for the
“fruits” of human trafficking.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, FIGHT SLAVERY NOW!, http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fightthere-are-27-million-reasons/the-law-and-trafficking/trafficking-victims-protection-act/traffic
king-victims-protection-act/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
210
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 33.
211

See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2013) (“Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or
Coercion”). Section 1591 criminalizes sex trafficking, which is defined as causing a “person to
engage in a commercial sex act” under certain statutorily enumerated conditions. Id. § 1591(a). A
“‘commercial sex act’ means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or
received by any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(3). The specific conditions are the use of force, fraud, or
coercion, or conduct involving persons under the age of 18. Id. § 1591(a). The punishment for
conduct that either involves a victim who is under the age of 14 or involves force, fraud, or
coercion is any term of years or life. Id. § 1591(b)(1). The punishment for conduct that involves a
victim between the ages of 14 and 18 is not to be less than ten years. Id. § 1591(b)(2).
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm While in Custody
1. Case Law Regarding Foster Children
Foster children’s rights while in custody of the state are not well
settled. However, recent federal decisions indicate that, under the Substantive
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, foster children have a right
to be free from harm while in custody; agencies can be held liable for
deprivation of this right. According to the Supreme Court, states deprive
individuals of their substantive due process when they are deliberately
indifferent to their fundamental rights. 212 “Deliberate indifference” is defined as
conscious or “reckless disregard” by a state actor.213 In the last two decades,
courts have occasionally found state foster care agencies to have been
deliberately indifferent to the substantive due process rights of foster children.
Until the early 1990s, there was no judicial precedent at all for a foster
child’s due process right to be free from harm. 214 In LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 215
the court recognized that children have a right to reasonably safe placements
where they will not suffer physical or emotional harm. 216 The court held that
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) 217 had a “special
relationship” with the city’s foster care children. 218 However, the court did not
say what this special relationship entailed. Should the state’s action be judged
on a “professional judgment” 219 standard, meaning the plaintiff has to prove
only negligence by the state, or must the state’s actions rise to the level of

212

See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828
(1994).
213
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839 (describing deliberate indifference in the context of a prison
official: “A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with
‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”).
214

See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988).
215

762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d and remanded sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore
v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
216

Id. at 992.
Hereinafter, all Departments of Social Services that are defendants in cases will be referred
to as “DSS” or “the state.”
218
Id. at 992 n.27.
217

219
The “professional judgment” standard was first articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982). The professional judgment standard is discussed, infra, in text accompanying
notes 232–35.
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“deliberate indifference” or “shock the conscience” 220 in order to find a
constitutional violation?
Following the LaShawn 221 decision, the right to be free from harm has
been precarious and often denied. In White by White v. Chambliss, 222 the
mother filed a § 1983 suit 223 against South Carolina DSS after her daughter
died in a foster home placement because of injuries (a blow to the head)
sustained from the abusive foster parents. 224 The mother claimed a violation of
her daughter’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 225 The court held that negligence was not enough to prove such a
violation; the daughter’s death did not “result from the DSS defendants’
violation of any ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” 226 DSS’s actions did not amount to
deliberate indifference because it was not “on notice of a danger and chose to
ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice.”227 Therefore, DSS was entitled
to qualified immunity. 228
In Conn v. Bull, 229 a two-year-old foster child drowned in the foster
mother’s pool and the county was sued under a deliberate indifference

220
The Supreme Court has established three levels of fault for state action—negligence,
deliberate indifference, and conduct that shocks the conscience. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 849, 851, 856 (1998). “Liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process,” id. at 849; “Deliberate indifference” is the standard to
employ “when actual deliberation [by a state actor] is practical,” id. at 851; and the highest
standard to apply is the “shocks-the-conscience” test, id. at 856.
221
762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d and remanded sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore
v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
222
112 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1997).
223
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state
law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013); see also Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841. In the rest of the
cases described in this Section, the plaintiffs made § 1983 claims that their substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were denied. Herein, all constitutional claims
described, unless otherwise indicated, were made by private citizens under § 1983 for violation
of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
224
White, 112 F.3d at 734.
225
226

Id.
Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

227

Id. at 737.
Id. at 740. Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under
§ 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Thus, before liability will attach, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
228

229

307 F. App’x 631 (3d Cir. 2009).
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theory. 230 The court held that there was no evidence that the parties were
deliberately indifferent 231 or that the individual officials were “responsible for
assuring the safety of the home, evaluating [the foster mother’s] fitness as a
parent, or placing [the child] in foster care.” 232 At best, the facts, as alleged,
established negligence, but they were not enough to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard. 233 Other cases have also held strictly to the deliberate
indifference standard, even when children have died in foster care. 234
Only recently have plaintiffs had success, but only on the deliberate
indifference standard and only when the defendants had actual knowledge of
the harm. In H.A.L. v. Foltz, 235 Florida DSS was held liable for sexual abuse in
the foster home because “no reasonable person in [the] [d]efendants’ place
could have believed that, by doing nothing to protect the children, they could
carry out their duties consistently with the Constitution.” 236 According to the
court, the defendants actually knew about the substantial risk of harm in the
Shick home, and nevertheless acted with deliberate indifference. 237 Other cases
have held likewise.238 As the Doe ex rel. Johnson v. South Carolina
Department of Social Services 239 court noted, in a claim regarding violations of
due process during a child’s adoption, the state has “some responsibility for

230
231
232
233

Id.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 635.

234
See Lethbridge ex rel. Estate of Lethbridge v. Forrest, No. 08-11423, 2010 WL 1417778, at
*68 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2010) (finding state not deliberately indifferent when plaintiff’s son died
in foster care after severe abuse by foster parents); Olivia Y. ex rel. Johnson v. Barbour, 351 F.
Supp. 2d 543, 553–56 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (finding no violation of foster children’s substantive due
process rights even though there was a special relationship between the state with those children;
it would be inappropriate to hold caretakers liable for constitutional deprivations when those
caretakers had exercised their professional judgment in determining the best course of conduct).
235
551 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2008).
236

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232 (“Taken together, these factors show that Defendants actually knew, and were
deliberately indifferent to, the substantial risk of Plaintiffs being sexually abused in the Shick
home.”).
237

238

E.g., Estate of Smith v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., No. 1:06cv362,
2007 WL 2572184, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007); see also A.P. ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver,
293 F. App’x 635, 653, 674 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims against individual defendants
because “our task . . . is to determine what each defendant actually knew prior to the alleged
abuse and what actions he or she took in response to that knowledge. . . . The complaint alleges
many facts from which the defendants could, or perhaps should, have inferred that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed in the Calhoun home; however, there are no specific allegations that
they actually drew such an inference and then chose to disregard it.”).
239

597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2010).
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[the child’s] safety and general well-being.” 240 But that certainly does not
“mean that every child in foster care may prevail in a § 1983 action against
state officials.” 241
Only one court has held that the professional judgment standard is
appropriate, 242 but it was never actually applied since the case, a class action,
ended in a consent decree. According to the Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue 243
court, state officials act in place of parents for foster children, who have done
nothing wrong. 244 Therefore, “foster children are entitled to a high standard.
Something more than refraining from indifferent action is required to protect
these innocents.” 245 Unfortunately, “something more” was not clearly defined
or applied to specific plaintiffs, and this case was not reported.246 On the bright
side, the consent decree forced the state to achieve and sustain some 31
outcomes in order to address constitutional concerns over foster care
placements. 247
The Kenny A. court actually followed the constitutional standard that
should be applied to foster children based on the Supreme Court’s other
Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has
recognized the substantive due process rights of other analogous, and less
sympathetic, populations. According to the Supreme Court, prisoners, 248 the

240
Id. at 175 (citing DeShaney ex rel. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
241
Id.
242

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 WL 5503780, at *3 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 13, 2004).
243

Id.
Id. (“The compelling appeal of the argument for the professional judgment standard is that
foster children, like involuntarily committed patients, are ‘entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions’ than criminals. These are young children, taken by the state from their parents for
reasons that generally are not the fault of the children themselves. The officials who place the
children are acting in place of the parents.” (quoting LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959,
996 (D.D.C. 1991))).
245
Id. at *4 (quoting Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003)).
244

246

The court applied the professional judgment standard in deciding that there were genuine
issues of material fact for trial, but the issues were never adjudicated for more clarity on what or
how social services should apply professional judgment. The court only found that the state
departed from minimal professional standards by failing to (1) adequately investigate and
respond to allegations of abuse, (2) ensure reasonable caseloads for caseworkers, (3) ensure that
caseworkers regularly visit foster children to monitor their safety, (4) provide consistent
casework services, (5) maintain accurate and timely casework documentation, and (6) adequately
screen and approve foster homes. Id. at *4.
247

The Kenny A. vs. Sonny Perdue Consent Decree, GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., https://dfcs.
dhs.georgia.gov/kenny-vs-sonny-perdue-consent-decree (last visted Mar. 1, 2015).
248

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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mentally ill and disabled, 249 residents of state juvenile training schools, 250
suspects in police custody, 251 and pretrial detainees 252 all have constitutional
rights while in custody. Importantly, adult mental institutions are held to higher
standards than prisons. In Youngberg v. Romero, 253 the Court rejected the
deliberate indifference standard because the right to safety for the
institutionalized was an “unquestioned duty” 254 of the state and was one of the
“essentials of the care that the state must provide.” 255 Because the mentally
disabled, unlike convicts, have not been found guilty of any wrongdoing,
government officials cannot make decisions that constitute a substantial
departure from “professional judgment,” causing injury to these liberty
interests. 256 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Eighth Amendment
subjective deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness standard should
govern the due process rights of those who are civilly, as opposed to criminally,
committed in state institutions. 257
Why then, when courts hold state foster care agencies accountable, will
they do so only on the deliberate indifference standard? Foster children are
even more defenseless and sympathetic than involuntarily committed adults.
They are innocent children, the mere subjects (for better or worse) of the state’s
actions against their parents, not them. 258 When a child is placed in foster care,
the state assumes the role of parent to a most vulnerable population. As one
federal court acknowledged, “[b]y ‘finding the children and placing them with
state approved families . . . , the state assumes an important continuing, if not
immediate, responsibility for the child’s wellbeing.’” 259 Biological parents have
their children taken away every day in this country for actions which fall far
below the “deliberate indifference” standard; 260 surely state parents should be
required to make professional judgments about their children.
249

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), modified, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir.
1983).
251
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983).
250

252
Bell, 441 U.S. at 531 (The confinement of pretrial detainees indiscriminately with
convicted persons is unconstitutional unless such a practice is “reasonably related to the
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security.”).
253
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307.
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 325.

As demonstrated throughout this Article, state actions are often biased and subjective.
Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992)).
260
See generally Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV.
L.J. 805 (2006) (In “the large majority of cases . . . children are ordered into foster care even
259

CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1258

4/21/2015 2:41 PM

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

2. Case Law Regarding Analogous Populations
i.

Pretrial Detainees and Prisoners

Pretrial detainees and prisoners have a constitutional right to be
protected from state actions, or lack thereof, which lead to their suicide. 261 In
order to prevail in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove deliberate
indifference on the part of the state. However, deliberate indifference can be
demonstrated when prison officials should know about a suicide risk and fail to
take reasonable or professional steps to prevent the suicide. 262 In Estate of
Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 263 the court held that the intake nurse,
psychology associate, and prison guards were all subjectively aware that an
inmate was a suicide risk. The prison officials did not need actual knowledge;
they “either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it.” 264 Once the subjective
knowledge risk is established, they are accountable for taking “reasonable
steps” to prevent the harm from the inmate’s suicidal tendencies. 265
Likewise, in Comstock v. McCrary, 266 the court held that evidence was
sufficient to establish liability for a prison psychologist who wrote a “grossly

though they have not suffered, and there is no serious risk of suffering, serious harm,” and
thousands of cases arise against parents in which mere neglect, based on flimsy evidence, is
alleged.); see also O’Donnell v. Brown, 335 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Anita Hassan,
Mixed Reviews After CPS Takes Kids from Family Shed, HOUS. CHRON. (July 8, 2011),
http://www.chroncom/news/houston-texas/article/Mixed-reviews-after-CPS-takes-kids-fromfamily-2080318.php; Alan Farnham, Answer to Recession: Houston Family of Eight Living in
Self-Storage, ABC NEWS (July 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/houston-texas-familyliving-storage-shed/story?id=14009261.
261
For pretrial detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated; for prisoners, it is the
Eighth Amendment, but the standard is the same. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d
1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996))
(“We have applied the deliberate indifference standard to a pretrial detainee’s § 1983 claim.”).
When the § 1983 claim is based on a jail suicide, the degree of protection accorded a detainee is
the same that an inmate receives when raising an inadequate medical attention claim under the
Eighth Amendment—deliberate indifference. See Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88, 91 (7th Cir.
1997) (“A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment (which applies to persons who have
been convicted) and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which applies to pretrial detainees . . . ) when he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate.”); see also Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Ryan,
957 F.2d 402, 405–06 (7th Cir. 1992). Eighth Amendment rights for prisoners are also implicated
in suicide cases, but will not be discussed here as foster children do not have Eighth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of Cills
v. Kaftan, 105 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000).
262
263
264
265
266

See generally Estate of Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 989.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 990.
Comstock v. McCray, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001).
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inadequate” psychological evaluation of a suicidal detainee. 267 “In this case, the
plaintiff has alleged facts which show that McCrary released Montgomery from
suicide watch without making any ‘reasoned assessment . . . of the patient’s
suicide risk.’” 268 The evaluation was conducted with “none of [the
psychologist’s] professional skills.” 269 Therefore, he was constitutionally
responsible for his suicide.
In Sanville v. McCaughtry, 270 an inmate, who had attempted suicide in
the past and whose mother had warned the prison of his tendencies, wrote a last
will and testament and refused to eat while in his cell. The guards were
therefore liable when he covered his cell windows with toilet paper, fashioned a
noose from his sheets, and asphyxiated himself.271 According to the court, “it
seems quite possible that . . . the guards could have been aware of the risk that
Matt would commit suicide[,]” 272 yet they failed to take “reasonable steps to
prevent” it. 273 The prison guards were accountable for reckless disregard—not
actual knowledge—and for their lack of reasonable action. 274
The language in these prison suicide cases resembles the language of a
professional judgment standard. 275 Even when ostensibly applying the term
“deliberate indifference,” the courts look to the totality of circumstances to
determine whether due process was deprived.276 The courts find enough
evidence when state officials fail to be reasonable.277 This line of cases is
helpful for making an argument for liability for foster runaways. In runaway
and missing foster child cases, a confluence of factors contribute to their
absence from care and the harms that ensue.
ii. Involuntarily Committed Adults
Involuntarily committed adults in mental institutions who harm
themselves because they are unsupervised are also protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The professional judgment standard has been applied.

267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 739–41.
Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 740.

275

See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (emphasizing that in determining what
is “reasonable,” courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional, whose decision is presumptively valid).
276
Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999).
277

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319.
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In Gann v. Schramm, 278 Gann escaped from the ward by picking the lock on the
screen to his window. 279 He was apprehended by a state policeman after a 15
minute absence.280 Upon his return, he was strip searched for contraband and
then examined by another staff doctor who ordered a sleeping pill for him. 281
The next morning, doctors came to see Gann while on their morning rounds.
He was still asleep and they decided not to wake him but continued “close
observation.” 282 After a roll call that same evening, Gann was reported missing
again. A search of the ward was instituted and Gann was not found. 283 The next
morning, Gann was found dead in the closet of his room in the Admissions
Ward. 284 A plastic bag like the type used in the facility’s kitchen was found
over his head. 285 The court held that the employees could be constitutionally
liable for this series of events under a professional judgment standard.286 The
court held, quoting Youngberg, that “liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 287
Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne 288 also involved a patient running away
from involuntary commitment. The parents of a son who was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder brought a § 1983 suit for the death of the son after he eloped
from the hospital. 289 The court held that even though it was a private hospital, it
was “clothed” with the authority of state law through its contract with the state,
among other things, 290 and it acted under color of state law for purposes of the
§ 1983 claim. 291 The Fourteenth Amendment protected Schorr’s due process
rights to be free from harm when involuntarily committed, including during the
period he had run away, and therefore the suit was allowed to go forward.292

278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292

Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Del. 1985).
Id. at 1446.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1448 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 488 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id.
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iii. Nursing Home Residents
An analogy can also be made to nursing home elopement and
wandering cases. About 10% of all lawsuits involving nursing homes deal with
elopements, or wandering. 293 Nursing homes are required by law to provide
adequate supervision to prevent wandering and the related complications and
injuries. 294 Nursing homes regulated by federal law can now also be liable for
deprivation of the due process rights of their voluntary residents. In Grammer
v. John J. Kane Regional Centers, 295 the Third Circuit allowed a § 1983 claim
to go forward against a nursing home whose failure to provide proper care and
supervision resulted in the death of a resident from malnourishment and
pressure sores.
If all of these populations—prisoners, mentally disabled adults, and the
elderly—have some form of constitutional right to be free from harms that
result from improper care and lack of supervision, surely the most vulnerable
and powerless population in the custody of the state should be entitled to the
same. Child wards of the state are, by definition, held involuntarily and in need
of deliberate, meaningful decision making by their guardians. They are not
legally permitted to run away or be missing. Their guardians are the ones
responsible for losing them. In fact, under age 18, they are not legally able to
make any of their own decisions. Surely these young people should not be
responsible for ensuring their own constitutional rights.
B. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm When Missing
There have been a handful of Fourteenth Amendment cases regarding
runaway and missing foster children, with varying results and no precedent.296
Several cases simply follow the deliberate indifference standard. In Smith v.
District of Columbia, 297 a 17-year-old was living in an apartment as part of an
independent living program. 298 There was little oversight and procedure for
selecting these companies or the management of the programs. 299 There were
also problems with the staff itself, including a counselor buying marijuana for

293

Residents of Nursing Homes Receiving Medicaid Can Now Bring Civil Rights Claims
Challenging Quality of Treatment, FOX ROTHSCHILD (July 2009), http://www.foxrothschild.com/
newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=10650.
294
42 U.S.C. § 1396(r)(1)–(8) (2013).
295

Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009).
See generally Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Nicini v. Morra,
212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Tate v. Arbor Heights Cmty. Justice Ctr., No. 06-14877, 2008 WL
3318733 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2008).
296

297
298
299

Smith, 413 F.3d 86.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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the children. 300 DSS did little, if anything, to monitor the facility. 301 In violation
of curfew, the plaintiff and his roommate let a visitor into their apartment who
shot and killed them. The murders brought the death toll of youths living in the
facility “to three out of sixteen (a fourth would be murdered by the end of the
year).” 302 The court held that by not adopting any criteria for independent
living programs and falling “below what national standards of care require of
states[,]” DSS was deliberately indifferent to the victim’s welfare. 303
Nicini v. Morra 304 also used the deliberate indifference standard.
Plaintiff was 15 years old when he went to the hospital after an attempted
suicide, and told caseworkers that his father physically abused him. 305 Plaintiff
was placed in two foster homes but ran away; he was subsequently sent by DSS
to live with the Morra family. 306 He ran away from the Morras and then from
the hospital to which he was admitted for psychiatric evaluation. He ran back to
the Morras and it was eventually arranged that the plaintiff would be placed
back in their home. 307 Caseworkers checked the home and said that everything
was positive, and there were no records of sexual abuse when the caseworker
performed background checks on the family. 308 The state and courts understood
the plaintiff’s placement as an unofficial home, not a foster home. 309 The
plaintiff later ran away again from the Morras’ home, and “told investigators
that since the second or third day of his arrival there, Edward Morra [the uncle]
had been providing him with drugs and alcohol and assaulting him sexually.” 310
It was later discovered that the uncle had prior convictions of “corrupting the
morals of a minor and for distribution of controlled substances to minors” and
was found guilty for his actions with the plaintiff. 311 In the child’s § 1983 suit
against DSS, the court held that even though the Morras were not a foster
home, the plaintiff was in state custody and the state placed the plaintiff in the
Morra home over the objections of his parents and aunt, so the placement was a

300

Id. at 91.

301

Id.
Id. at 92.

302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311

Id. at 99.
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id.
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“special relationship.” 312 However, the court held that the caseworker’s conduct
did not rise to deliberate indifference and amounted to negligence, at worst. 313
A district court case, Tate v. Arbor Heights Community Justice
Center, 314 hinted at a standard higher than deliberate indifference, but still did
not establish a clear constitutional right for runaways. 315 Tate had a pattern of
running away from home and was involuntarily committed to a low-security
juvenile facility operated by DSS. 316 While under the supervision of two staff
members, Tate ran away with some young adult males, and at some point while
away from the center, Tate claims she was raped. 317 Tate alleged the staff
violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing her out of sight and
failing to prevent her from running away. 318 The court stated, “the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on the state ‘an unquestioned duty to provide reasonable
safety for all residents and personnel within the institution,’” 319 and found that
the staff knew Tate displayed a compulsion toward risky sexual behavior
(running away before with young adult males), a diminished capacity for selfcontrol, and a known propensity for truancy. 320 Her status as a state ward was
predicated on the judgment that she required supervision to avoid endangering

312
313

Id. at 809.
Id. at 815.

314
Tate v. Arbor Heights Cmty. Justice Ctr., No. 06-14877, 2008 WL 3318733 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 8, 2008).
315
“Throughout this analysis, courts must acknowledge that a heightened degree of protection
must be afforded to the involuntarily committed.” Id. at *4 (quoting Terrance v. Northville Reg’l
Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2002)).
316
Id. at *1.
317

Id. at *2.
Tate claimed that Larson and Lenoir violated her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by failing to do more to prevent her from running away at the movie theater. Because Tate was
involuntarily committed to Arbor Heights rather than being convicted in criminal proceedings,
she was not subjected to “punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; the
Fourteenth Amendment supplies the proper constitutional standard for evaluating her claim. Id. at
*3 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–16 (1982)) (recognizing involuntarily
committed patient’s right to “conditions of reasonable care and safety” under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Terrance, 286 F.3d at 848 (“The involuntarily committed have greater rights
regarding confinement under the Fourteenth Amendment than criminals are due under the Eighth
Amendment.”); Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442, 1447–49 (D. Del. 1985) (recognizing
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under § 1983 for suicide death of
involuntarily committed mental patient).
319
Tate, 2008 WL 3318733, at *4 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 342).
318

320
The court found that her impulsivity and unrestrained sexuality resulted in a serious danger
to herself that may be likened to a suicidal impulse. As such, the court found it compelling that
other courts have found that summary judgment is inappropriate where hospital staff disregard a
serious risk of suicide. See, e.g., Sidwell v. Cnty. of Jersey, No. 05-cv-530-DRH, 2006 WL
1375224 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2006).
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her own health and safety. 321 Thus, the staff should have foreseen the
substantial risk, and therefore, their motion for summary judgment was
denied. 322
Ward ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver 323 went further in establishing
liability, but still fell short of declaring a constitutional right for runaways and
missing foster children. Foster child Valerie Ward was raped while missing
from her foster home. 324 The court found that the state could be held
responsible for the crime committed against Valerie because she had a
tendency to run away, which the state was aware of; she was not properly
supervised or cared for in her foster home; and she was placed in a foster home
rife with problems, thereby exposing her to danger and harm. 325 The court
stated,
children in foster homes, unlike children in public schools, are
isolated; no persons outside the home setting are present to
witness and report mistreatment. The children are helpless.
Without the investigation, supervision, and constant contact
required by statute, a child placed in a foster home is at the
mercy of the foster parents. 326
The Ward court drew on other cases to show where it would draw the
line in terms of state responsibility for a child in custody. In Zemola v.
Johnson, 327 plaintiff Elizabeth Zemola was placed in a group home known to
be loosely structured and dangerous, even though the state was aware of
Zemola’s suicidal tendencies, lack of self-control, and violent background, and
it believed she should be placed in a highly structured environment with close
psychiatric monitoring. 328 While in the group home she was introduced to
pimps, used as a prostitute for child pornography, and given drugs. 329 The court
found that placing Zemola in such a “snake pit,” constituted a violation of her
constitutional rights. 330 Moreover, the court found no qualified immunity would
apply because it was “self-evident that by placing Zemola in an environment

321

Tate, 2008 WL 3318733, at *5.

322

Id.
Ward ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver, No. 99-6745-cv-MORENO, 2000 WL 34025227 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 29, 2000).
324
Id. at *2.
323

325

Id. at *6.
Id. at *4 n.6 (quoting Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir.
1987)).
327
Zemola v. Johnson, No. 89-c-0798, 1989 WL 88229 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1989).
326

328
329
330

Ward, 2000 WL 34025227, at *4 (citing Zemola, 1989 WL 88229, at *1).
Id.
Id. at *5.
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where she would be expected to be abused by outsiders” her constitutional
rights were violated. 331 In contrast, in Cooper v. Montgomery County Office of
Children & Youth, 332 the district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss
because the causal link between what happened to the foster child when
physically outside of the foster home—he was struck by a truck and killed
while crossing the street—was too remote. 333
In the Ward case, while the defendants tried to argue that Valerie was
not harmed by the foster parent or on foster home premises, the court made a
distinction, saying that Valerie’s psychological problems and tendency to run
away reinforced the state’s affirmative duty to the child.334 Valerie’s actual
location at the time of the injury did not take away from the duties owed by the
state given the circumstances.335 The court dismissed the state’s motion to
dismiss 336 and denied qualified immunity. 337
One wrongful death case also provides guidance because it involved a
crime committed against a runaway who was not a foster child at the time of
the murder but was receiving child welfare services at home. In Tobias v.
County of Racine, 338 the adolescent was in foster care and had a history of
running away from home and subsequently from foster home placements.339
The teenager was returned to her mother, but the mother signed a voluntary
agreement to continue services with social services.340 Four months later, the
teenager ran away again to a dangerous part of the county. 341 After this
incident, the caseworker went to the apartment and concluded that it was safe
and left her there as long as she agreed to go to counseling. 342 A few days later,
the teenager was shot and killed near the apartment.343 The teenager’s mother
brought a wrongful death action against the county for negligence “when it

331

Id.

332

No. 93-3137, 1993 WL 477084 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1993).
Id. at *5.

333
334
335

Ward, 2000 WL 34025227, at *6.
Id.

336

Id. at *9.
However, the court did not foreclose raising the qualified immunity defense when it may
be more appropriate. Id. at *8.
338
Tobias v. Cnty. of Racine, 507 N.W.2d 340, 340 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
337

339
340
341
342
343

Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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failed to issue a capias order” for the teenager’s arrest. 344 The court held that
the injury was too remote because it was not foreseeable that a “third person
would commit a crime against [the teenager] because of the opportunity created
by the county’s negligence.” 345 The court, however, stated that the county was
negligent in not issuing the capias because it should have been aware that it was
unsafe for the teenager to be out in the streets. 346 Although the crime was a
superseding cause, the court left open the possibility for state liability in a
runaway case of a child who was not even in custody of the state, but only
receiving state services.
C. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm Following
Discharge—Analogy to State-Created Danger Cases
No cases have been brought alleging constitutional violations for harms
suffered by a foster child, or class of foster children, after official discharge
from foster care. But an analogy can be made to the “state-created danger”
cases, in which the government is held constitutionally liable for actions
towards private citizens who are not in their custody, and are often less
sympathetic, than foster children.347 The state-created danger doctrine was first
developed by the Seventh Circuit in White v. Rochford 348 and Bowers v.
DeVito. 349 That court held that the Constitution protects persons who, while not
in state custody, are nevertheless placed by the state in a position of danger and
then left defenseless. According to the Seventh Circuit, when the state, by its
actions, throws a person in a “snakepit,” the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process is triggered. 350
Similarly, in Wood v. Ostrander, 351 the Ninth Circuit held that police
officers could be liable for the rape of the car’s passenger after the police left
her on the side of the road in a high crime area. Davis v. Brady 352 also involved
police stopping a drunk driver. There, the police were responsible for the drunk
driver’s injuries after the police left the driver with his keys, and the driver later

344
Id. A capias order is “an order to arrest and detain an individual for the purpose of
guaranteeing a court appearance.” THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/
what-is-a-capias-warrant/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
345
Tobias, 507 N.W.2d at 342.
346
347
348
349
350
351
352

Id. at 340.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2007).
White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 618.
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998).
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collided with another vehicle.353 The court, like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, held
that it was the government that put this person in danger and the government
should be held liable.354 Similarly, in Munger v. City of Glasgow, 355 police
were called to a bar when there was a dispute and ultimately kicked a man out
of the bar and took away his keys. It was a cold night and he was dressed just in
jeans and a t-shirt. 356 The police would not let him back into the bar or his
car. 357 The man died of hypothermia. 358 The court held that the government
created the danger and the government was responsible for depriving his life
without due process. 359
Even pretrial detainees have such rights. In Paine v. Johnson, 360 the
guardian of the estate of the pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from
bipolar disorder, brought suit against the city and city police officers. The
plaintiff alleged civil rights violations in connection with the detainee’s arrest
and subsequent release from custody to a high risk situation, given her mental
condition, in which she was ultimately raped.361 Police officers were denied
summary judgment because fact issues existed as to whether the officer who
released the detainee from custody violated the detainee’s substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 362 Significantly, the court held
that many factors or conduct of two or more persons may operate at the same
time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; in such case
each may be the proximate cause of an injury, as required to establish liability
under the Constitution. 363 Moreover, the court held that legal causation is a
fact-specific inquiry and involves consideration of time, geography, range of
potential victims, and the nature of harm that occurred.364
Most relevant to foster children is Currier v. Doran. 365 In Currier, a
social worker transferred custody of a child from the mother to the father. 366

353
354
355
356
357
358

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1027.
Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1085.

359

Id. at 1088.
Paine v. Johnson, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012).
361
Id. at 1082.
360

362
363
364
365
366

Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 905.
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The father subsequently killed the child.367 A § 1983 suit was brought and the
issue was whether the social worker could be held liable for state-created
danger. 368 The Tenth Circuit, finding the social worker liable under a deliberate
indifference standard, held that the child “would not have been exposed to the
dangers from [his] father but for the affirmative acts of the state [social
worker.]” 369
The holdings of these state-created danger cases can be applied to
foster children. The state creates inevitable dangers when it discharges youths
to conditions in which they will obviously flounder. For example, states
invariably release youths to homeless shelters with no supportive adults in their
lives and no prospects for finding actual places to live. 370 An 18-year-old girl,
who has been discharged, with no job, to a shelter in a crime ridden area, where
pimps are known to operate, could prove proximate cause and state
responsibility if she becomes a victim of sexual exploitation.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY

Now is the time for foster children to bring § 1983 claims, whether
individually or by class action, for the sexual exploitation they endure when
missing from foster care or shortly after discharge. 371 This is the only way to
make state agencies and caseworkers pay attention and for the recent federal
legislation to have any teeth. It is also essential, while there is a national
spotlight on this issue, for courts to establish constitutional protections for
runaway and discharged foster children.

367
368

Id.
Id.

369

Id. at 918.
See supra Part II; see also Homeless Youth, NAT’L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (June
2008), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/youth.html; Proposed Class Action
Settlement Averts the Danger of Homelessness for Young People Aging Out of Foster Care,
LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.legal-aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/
inthenews/proposedclassactionsettlementavertsthedangerofhomelessness.aspx (“‘An alarming
number of young people are being discharged from foster care into homelessness,’ said Tamara
Steckler, Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights practice at The Legal Aid Society.”).
370

371
Civil rights actions can be brought in federal and/or state court. State courts may properly
hear § 1983 cases pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. The
Supremacy Clause mandates that states must provide hospitable forums for federal claims and
the vindication of federal rights. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2. This point was solidified in the
Supreme Court decision of Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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Establishing legal precedent is particularly important because of the
doctrine of qualified immunity from § 1983 claims. 372 Qualified immunity
protects government officials from individual liability under § 1983 for actions
taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their “conduct violates
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” 373 Before liability will attach, “the contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” 374
The right can be “sufficiently clear” without Supreme Court or other
holdings specifically on point. “[A] Supreme Court decision is not absolutely
imperative before a law may be considered ‘clearly established.’” 375 In People
of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners, 376 the Third Circuit
addressed the issue of how “clearly established” a law must be in order for it to
defeat qualified immunity. A clearly establish law can simply mean that
“officials apply general, well developed legal principles. . . . [W]e cannot
expect executive officials to anticipate the evolution of constitutional law,
neither can we be faithful to the purposes of immunity by permitting such
officials one liability-free violation of a constitutional or statutory
requirement.” 377
“General legal principles” regarding constitutional rights can emanate
from a variety of courts with jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims. 378
Federal district and circuit courts, as well as state courts, can establish the
principle for their respective lower courts. 379 This is why we need to establish
precedent now by bringing cases. Using the right to be free from harm and

372
See Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (1985) (“There are four prerequisites to
constitute a valid claim under section 1983; that is, (1) the defendants must have acted under
color of state law; (2) the conduct must have implicated a life, liberty or property interest; (3) a
deprivation of the particular interest; and (4) the deprivation was without due process of law.”).
373
374
375
376
377
378
379

Id. at 1449 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1449.
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 144–45.
Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1449.

See, e.g., id. (“A ruling of the Third Circuit is enough for law to be considered ‘clearly
established.’”); Dehorty v. New Castle Cnty. Council, 560 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1983). This
district has also noted that the rulings of three Courts of Appeals (not including the Third Circuit)
are sufficient for a legal principle to be considered well established. Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C.
v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311, 1321 (D. Del. 1979). “[T]he only difference [in court rulings] is in
the standard applied to determine when the violation of that right infringes upon fourteenth
amendment rights.” Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1450. “Although the Third Circuit decision alone may
not have been enough to render the legal principle clearly established, . . . [t]hree circuits as well
as a number of district courts had acknowledged such a right.” Id. (citations omitted).
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state-created danger doctrines discussed in Part IV, we can begin to develop
jurisprudence for missing and discharged foster children. 380
VII.

CONCLUSION

Youths aging out of foster care are one of the most vulnerable
populations in this country. That we should allow them to transition from foster
care to dire outcomes, only occasionally holding their custodians to minimal
constitutional standards, is unacceptable. The sexual exploitation of adolescents
involved with the child welfare system has recently gained much needed
attention. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act,
discussed in Section III.B, will also help establish the right of missing and
discharged foster children to be free from sexual exploitation. The Act must be
publicized, the records kept and reported, and the training disseminated. This
will be hard work, especially at the front lines. As CWLA, the only group to
publish a handbook on working with youths missing from care 381 emphasizes,
those who work with children in care must proactively . . .
prevent missing-from-care episodes, rather than merely
reacting once a child has gone missing . . . successful
prevention efforts are built on sound administration; quality
supervision; effective training; and frequent contacts between
workers and caregivers, works and children in care, and
children and their birth families and relatives. 382
The problem, however, has gone on far too long to wait for the
legislation to trickle down to front line caseworkers. Legislation targeted at
adolescents in foster care, going back to 1999, has not put an end to the harsh

380
An example of a court using a general legal principle established by federal courts to apply
to another context is also found in Gann: “Further support that this right to safety was clearly
established may be found in some of the eighth amendment prison cases.” 606 F. Supp. at 1450
(emphasis added). In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court noted that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Individuals who are involuntarily confined in a mental hospital certainly should have no less
rights than a prisoner. N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Indeed, “[i]t would be anomalous to find that the right to a secure
environment, which federal courts have often intervened to protect in the context of penal
institutions, did not extend to facilities for the mentally retarded.” Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
F.2d 147, 162 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, in December 1980, the right to a safe environment for those
involuntarily committed to mental institutions had received wide acceptance by the courts. The
right was a general, well developed legal principle that officials at a state mental hospital should
have been applying daily. If they did not do so, they have forfeited the privilege of official
immunity.
381
CWLA, supra note 21, at X–XV.
382

Id. at 9.
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realities of aging out. Statutes and rhetoric can only do so much. Those legally
in charge of young people must be accountable for protecting them. Sexual
exploitation should not be an inevitable outcome of the United States foster
care system.

